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SORTING OUT THE SHOOTOUT:  FLORIDA COURTS UNTANGLE THE 
“STAND YOUR GROUND LAW” 
Lawrence J. Semento* 
INTRODUCTION 
In February 2008, Gabriel Mobley finished work at his pressure cleaning 
business and, after going home to shower and change, went to the office of his high 
school friend, Jose “Chico” Correa.1 After working several hours at Chico’s tax 
preparation business, Mobley joined Chico and his staff at a local Chili’s to 
unwind.2 Mobley drove his own car to the restaurant.3 When he arrived, he 
removed the handgun he had been carrying and stowed it in the glove 
compartment.4 Mobley had a concealed weapons permit, but left the gun in the car 
because he believed he could not carry it into a restaurant.5 By the time Mobley 
entered the restaurant, several of Chico’s female employees were sitting in a booth, 
so Mobley joined Chico and another male employee at the bar nearest the booth.6 
After food and drinks were ordered, Mobley and Chico went outside to smoke.7 
They returned to the bar and ate, drank, and conversed.8 Mobley and Chico then 
went outside to smoke a second time.9 When they returned inside, they found two 
men, Jason Gonzalez and Rolando “Roly” Carrazana, talking with the female 
employees at the booth.10 Chico believed that the women were uncomfortable, so 
he asked the men to leave.11 A verbal altercation ensued, which ended when the 
men returned to their own table at the opposite end of the bar.12 Overhearing the 
brief altercation, the restaurant manager asked the security guard to keep watch on 
Jason and Roly.13 
 ________________________  
     *  Circuit Judge, 5th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Florida. J.D., University of Florida College of Law. 
B.A., University of South Carolina. Judge Semento has been a circuit judge since 2002, and he serves as Chief 
Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit Appellate Division. Judge Semento has served as an Associate Judge on the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal. He was in the private practice of law for twenty years prior to appointment to the 
bench. 
 1. Mobley v. State, 132 So. 3d 1160, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1162. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1162. 
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Mobley was not involved in the argument.14 Instead, he acted as a peacekeeper, 
and went to Jason’s and Roly’s table to ask them to forget the petty incident.15 He 
shook Jason’s hand.16 Mobley felt uncomfortable, however, when he later saw 
Roly staring at Chico’s group with a mean look on his face.17 Mobley decided to 
leave, but before doing so, went into the restroom with Chico where he expressed 
his concerns.18 When exiting the restroom, Mobley saw Jason, with Roly outside, 
banging aggressively on the restaurant window and pointing at them.19 Mobley 
suggested that once Jason and Roly left the area, they should all go home.20 
Mobley left Chili’s about ten to fifteen minutes later, when it appeared that Jason 
and Roly were gone.21 
Mobley, wearing a sleeveless t-shirt, went to his vehicle, which was parked 
near the front door.22 At his vehicle, he put on a sweatshirt because it was cold.23 
He retrieved his handgun and placed it in a holster on his waist.24 Within a minute 
after Mobley left the restaurant, Chico and one of his other employees walked 
out.25 Mobley joined them and they walked to Chico’s vehicle, which was parked 
nearby.26 Mobley and Chico stepped onto the sidewalk and smoked cigarettes.27 A 
few seconds after they stepped onto the sidewalk, Jason rapidly approached and 
delivered a vicious punch to Chico’s face, which fractured his eye socket.28 Jason 
danced back with fists raised, then quickly advanced toward Mobley.29 Mobley 
reacted by raising his arm to fend off Jason.30 As Jason stepped back, Roly came 
running toward Mobley and Chico from the back of the restaurant.31 Roly neared 
Jason, who was only a few feet from Mobley and Chico.32 Mobley feared a new 
attack, and saw Roly reach under his long, baggy shirt for what he believed to be a 
weapon.33 Mobley drew his gun, and shot at Roly.34 The shots hit both Roly and 
Jason.35 
Jason turned to flee, but collapsed.36 He died of a gunshot wound to the chest.37 
Roly, hit four times, fell near the entrance to the restaurant.38 He later died from the 
 ________________________  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1163. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1163. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1163. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1163. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1163–64. 
 34. Id. at 1164. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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gunshot wounds.39 Two knives were found on the ground near where Roly fell, but 
no weapon was located on his body.40 
Gabriel Mobley’s journey through the legal system would follow a 
significantly different path than those who traveled it before 2005. Amid some 
controversy, Florida became the first state to radically revamp its self-defense 
laws.41 In 2005, Governor Jeb Bush signed into law Florida’s “Stand Your Ground 
Law.”42 The smoldering controversy surrounding the enactment of the law burst 
ablaze when Trayvon Martin was killed.43 The new legislation substantially 
changed existing self-defense laws, both substantively and procedurally. 
Prior to 2005, Florida law permitted the use of deadly force in self-defense 
only if one reasonably believed that it was necessary to prevent imminent death or 
great bodily harm.44 Even in those situations, a person must use reasonable means 
to avoid the danger, including retreat.45 However, when a person claims self-
defense in his or her own home, an exception to the common law duty to retreat 
applies.46 This privilege of non-retreat from the home is known as the “castle 
doctrine.”47 Florida law allowed one charged with a crime involving force to raise 
self-defense as an affirmative defense at trial.48 Whether a person is justified in the 
use of deadly force in self-defense is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.49 
If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of self-defense, then the burden shifts 
to the State to overcome the defense.50 The State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.51 
  
 37. Mobley, 132 So. 3d at 1164. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Florida Legislation—The Controversy over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law—FLA. 
STAT. § 776.013 (2005), 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 351, 351–53 (2005) [hereinafter The Controversy]; Jennifer 
Randolph, Comment, How to Get Away with Murder: Criminal and Civil Immunity Provisions in “Stand Your 
Ground” Legislation, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 614 (2014) (“The Florida legislature was the first to pass a 
comprehensive update of its self-defense law . . . but it was most certainly not the last. . . . Since 2005, more than 
half of the states have enacted or considered similar legislation to Florida’s statute.”).  
 42. Zachary L. Weaver, Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for 
Clarification, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2008) (noting that Jeb Bush signed the Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” 
Law in 2005). In this article, the term “Stand Your Ground Law” is used to refer to the legislation that amended or 
modified Florida’s self-defense laws, as codified in sections 776.012, 776.013, and 776.032, of the Florida 
Statutes. See The Controversy, supra note 41, at 352 n.173. 
 43. Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon Martin Killing: 
The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
271, 271–73 (2012).   
 44. FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2004) (amended 2014); see Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999). 
 45. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1049–50 (“[W]hen one is violently assaulted in his own house or immediately surrounding 
premises, he is not obliged to retreat but may stand his ground and use such force as prudence and caution would 
dictate as necessary to avoid death or great bodily harm.” (quoting Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 
1965))).  
 48. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049. 
 49. Hernandez v. State, 842 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 50. State v. Rivera, 719 So. 2d 335, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 51. Brown v. State, 454 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
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The Stand Your Ground Law significantly changed Florida’s self-defense laws. 
Most notably, it eliminated the duty to retreat in most instances.52 It also 
established a presumption that force was used reasonably where a defendant is 
faced with an intruder in a home or occupied vehicle.53 Further, it enlarged a 
person’s right to avoid civil or criminal consequences for the use of force, 
including deadly force.54 Perhaps this change is the most radical from prior self-
defense law. 
Since the enactment of these revisions to Florida’s self-defense laws, Florida 
courts have undertaken the task of interpreting and implementing the statutes. 
There has been confusion as to the proper procedures to follow. “Despite section 
776.032’s broad temporal application, running from before arrest through trial, 
there is no legislative guidance as to the statute’s implementation.”55 This article 
will review and analyze those cases, particularly focusing on issues concerning (1) 
immunity from prosecution in both civil and criminal cases; (2) pretrial immunity 
hearings; (3) unlawful activities precluding the defense; (4) self-defense jury 
instructions; and (5) appropriate procedures for appeal. Understanding the changes 
in Florida’s self-defense laws is vitally important for law enforcement officers, 
defendants, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges. This article is intended to 
provide a better understanding of the law as currently interpreted and implemented 
by the courts. 
I.  IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
An individual who uses justifiable force is immune from both civil action and 
criminal prosecution.56 Section 776.032 provides that “[a] person who uses or 
threatens to use force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is 
justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action 
for the use or threatened use of such force . . . .”57 As mentioned above, section 
776.012, as revised in 2005, permits a person to use non-deadly force against 
another when the person reasonably believes it is necessary to defend against the 
use of unlawful force.58 It allows the use of deadly force without a duty to retreat if 
a person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death 
or great bodily harm or the commission of a forcible felony.59 Section 776.013, as 
enacted in 2005, creates a presumption that a person held a reasonable fear of 
imminent peril of death or great bodily harm when using deadly force to defend 
 ________________________  
 52. FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1), (2) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 53. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 54. FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 55. Horn v. State, 17 So. 3d 836, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). The court went on to say: “Thus far, two 
other district courts have examined the issues presented by the statute and have reached differing results regarding 
the proper procedures to follow.” Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. § 776.032(1). 
 58. FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 59. Id. at (2). 
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against another while in a residence or vehicle.60 The presumption does not apply 
in certain instances. For example, one who is engaged in a criminal activity may 
not avail himself of the presumption.61 Section 776.013(3) expands the “castle 
doctrine”62: 
A person who is attacked in his or her dwelling, residence, or 
vehicle has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her 
ground and use or threaten to use force, including deadly force, if 
he or she uses or threatens to use force in accordance with § 
776.012(1) or (2) or § 776.031(1) or (2).63 
Although the Stand Your Ground Law creates immunity, the proper procedures 
for one to seek the immunity are not specified. Since the enactment of the Law, 
Florida courts have considered this issue. The First District Court of Appeal of 
Florida was one of the first to do so.64 In Peterson v. State, the defendant filed a 
motion to dismiss the information based on his claim of immunity from 
prosecution under the Stand Your Ground Law.65 The State argued that the motion 
should have been filed as a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.190(c)(4).66 Thus, the State asserted, any factual dispute would defeat 
the motion.67 However, noting an absence of procedure for handling immunity 
claims in Florida, the First District followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court of 
Colorado,68 and held that a defendant may raise the issue of statutory immunity 
pretrial and when such a claim is raised, the trial court must determine whether the 
defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that immunity attaches.69 
The court noted that this is a similar burden placed on a defendant for motions 
challenging the voluntariness of confessions.70 The Second,71 Third,72 and Fifth 
Districts followed Peterson.73 
However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida reached a different 
result. In Velasquez v. State, the court found that when a motion to dismiss is used 
 ________________________  
 60. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 61. Id. at (2)(c). 
 62. “The privilege of nonretreat from the home, part of the ‘castle doctrine,’ has early common law 
origins.” Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999) (footnote omitted) (citing State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 
724, 725 (Fla. 1982); Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1965); Pell v. State, 97 Fla. 650, 665 (1929); 
Danford v. State, 53 Fla. 4, 13 (1907); People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 240 (1914)). 
 63. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 64. See Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. This is commonly called a “C-4 motion.” See, e.g., State v. Purvis, 560 So. 2d 1296, 1297 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 67. Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29. A court is not permitted to make factual determinations in considering a “C-
4 motion.”  Clark v. State, 993 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). See generally FLA. R. C. P. 3.190 
(c)(4). 
 68. Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29 (citing People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 981–82 (Colo. 1987). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Horn v. State, 17 So. 3d 838, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  
 72. State v. Yaqubie, 51 So. 3d 474, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 73. Gray v. State, 13 So. 3d 114, 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
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to seek immunity from prosecution, the rule of procedure provides the framework 
for the court to make its determination.74 If there are factual issues, the motion to 
dismiss must be denied.75 
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved this conflict in 2010.76 The court in 
Dennis v. State framed the issue: “In this case we consider whether a trial court 
should conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing and resolve issues of fact when ruling 
on a motion to dismiss asserting immunity from criminal prosecution pursuant to 
section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2006), commonly known as the ‘Stand Your 
Ground’ statute.”77 The court noted that Florida law has long recognized a 
defendant’s right to assert by affirmative defense that the use of force was 
justified.78 However, this statute grants defendants “a substantive right to not be 
arrested, detained, charged, or prosecuted as a result of the use of legally justified 
force.”79 Following the reasoning of Peterson, the court concluded that when a 
defendant files a motion to dismiss on the basis of the statutory immunity, the trial 
court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve any factual issues80: 
We conclude that where a criminal defendant files a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to section 776.032, the trial court should decide 
the factual question of the . . . statutory immunity. A motion to 
dismiss on the basis of section 776.032 immunity is not subject to 
the requirements of rule 3.190(c)(4) but instead should be treated 
as a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.190(b).81 
Another procedural issue concerns the timing of the immunity hearing.82 That 
issue was addressed in Martinez v. State.83 Seven weeks prior to his second-degree 
murder trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a motion seeking 
immunity under the Stand Your Ground Law, and demanded a pretrial hearing.84 
 ________________________  
 74. Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 458 (Fla. 2010). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 462. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 464. 
 81. Id. Rule 3.190(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: “All defenses available to a 
defendant by plea, other than not guilty, shall be made only by motion to dismiss the indictment or information, 
whether the same shall relate to matters of form, substance, former acquittal, former jeopardy, or any other 
defense.” FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(b). 
 82. Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
By defining “criminal prosecution” to include the arrest, detention, charging, or prosecution 
of the defendant, the statute allows for an immunity determination at any stage of the 
proceeding. . . . [T]he statute authorized the immunity determination to be made by law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries. In enacting the statute, however, the 
legislature did not restrict the time frame for determining immunity, but rather provided a 
time continuum stretching across the entire criminal process. 
Id. 
 83. Martinez v. State, 44 So. 3d 1219, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).  
 84. Id.  
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Determining that there was insufficient time to hear the motions prior to trial, the 
lower court did not hold a pretrial hearing and decided to conduct the hearing 
during the trial.85 The appellate court held that when a motion seeking immunity is 
filed well in advance of trial, the proper procedure is for the court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing prior to the trial, and the failure to do so “operates to deprive a 
defendant of at least some measure of the ‘true’ immunity contemplated by 
legislature.”86 
In Martinez, the State offered what may be a very legitimate concern; a 
defendant could abuse the process by withholding a claim to immunity until such 
time as it may garner a procedural or substantive advantage.87 However, the court 
found there was no evidence that the defendant had done so in this case.88 
The courts have also addressed the issue of the burden of proof on a motion to 
dismiss filed under section 776.032.89 In Peterson v. State, the court, noting the 
absence of procedures for implementation of the statute, held that it is the 
defendant’s burden to prove entitlement to immunity from prosecution by a 
preponderance of the evidence.90 Although not a dispositive issue in the case, by 
approving the procedures set out in Peterson v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida 
seems to agree.91 
A recent case from the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida, Bretherick v. 
State, squarely addressed this issue.92 There, the defendant believed he was 
threatened by another motorist on a busy highway.93 When the other motorist 
stopped in front of his vehicle, the defendant pointed a firearm at the driver and 
held him at gunpoint.94 The defendant was charged with aggravated assault.95 He 
filed a motion to dismiss based on the self-defense immunity from prosecution.96 
After conducting a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied the motion.97 
The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court improperly placed the 
burden on him.98 Although affirming the denial of his motion, the appellate court 
addressed the burden of proof: “The issue of who bears the burden of proof may 
well be significant where the case is an extremely close one, or where only limited 
 ________________________  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1221. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). This is not to be confused with 
the burden of proof on an affirmative defense of self-defense. In that instance, it is well established that a 
defendant claiming self-defense bears the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of self-defense. Once that 
is accomplished, the burden shifts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in 
self-defense. Leasure v. State, 105 So. 3d 5, 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). See generally FLA. STAT. § 776.032 
(2013) (amended 2014).  
 90. Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29. 
 91. Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010). 
 92. Bretherick v. State,135 So. 3d 337, 339–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 93. Id. at 338. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Bretherick, 135 So. 3d at 340. 
7
Semento: Sorting Out the Shootout: Florida Courts Untangle the "Stand Your
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2014
8 Barry Law Review Vol. 20, No. 1 
 
evidence is presented for the trial court’s consideration.”99 The court certified the 
following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: “ONCE THE DEFENSE 
SATISFIES THE INITIAL BURDEN OF RAISING THE ISSUE, DOES THE 
STATE HAVE THE BURDEN OF DISPROVING A DEFENDANT’S 
ENTITLEMENT TO SELF-DEFENSE IMMUNITY AT A PRETRIAL 
HEARING AS IT DOES AT TRIAL?”100 
The Supreme Court of Florida has accepted jurisdiction.101 A decision has not 
yet been rendered,102 so it is undecided whether the State’s burden in an immunity 
hearing is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as it is at trial, or whether it has a 
lesser burden to overcome the defendant’s obligation to present proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Certainly, this is an important matter for the trial courts. Cases in which a 
defendant seeks immunity based on self-defense under the Stand Your Ground 
Law are usually factually complicated and disputed. State v. Gallo is a good 
example.103 
“Mr. Barbour’s unfortunate death resulted from events reminiscent of the 
‘Shootout at OK Corral,’” the opinion begins.104 The appellate court recognized 
that the trial judge conducted an evidentiary pretrial hearing, “made determinations 
of credibility, weighed the numerous pieces of conflicting evidence, and set forth 
extensive factual findings in a nine-page written order.”105 In affirming the granting 
of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court noted:  
The legislature’s enactment of section 776.032 placed the burden 
of weighing the evidence in ‘Stand Your Ground’ cases squarely 
upon the trial judge’s shoulders. In this case, that burden required 
the trial judge to make order out of the chaos that occurred in 
Sarasota on one fateful night in 2010.106 
It is clear that a defendant who loses a pretrial motion to dismiss based on self-
defense immunity is not precluded from raising the issue at trial.107 In Tover v. 
State, the court stated that the denial of the defendant’s pretrial motion was 
“without prejudice to [the defendant] raising the Stand Your Ground statutory 
 ________________________  
 99. Id. at 341. 
 100. Id. For an excellent analysis of the issue, see Associate Judge Schumann’s concurring opinion. He 
notes that other states that have modeled their self-defense immunity statutes based on Florida’s have determined 
that the burden of proof at the pretrial stage rests with the state to show that the use of force in self-defense was 
unjustified. Id. at 342. 
 101. Bretherick v. State, No. SC13–2312, 2014 WL 1659779, at *1 (Fla. 2014).  
 102. Id. (On April 15, 2014 an opinion was rendered).  
 103. State v. Gallo, 76 So. 3d 407, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  
 104. Id. at 408. 
 105. Id. at 409. 
 106. Id. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Judge Salter’s dissenting opinion in Mobley v. State. 
132 So. 3d 1160, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). Reasonable people considering the same facts can reach 
different legal conclusions. See id. In Mr. Mobley’s case, Judge Salter in his dissent noted that four judges, hearing 
the same almost-undisputed evidence, “split evenly” on whether Mr. Mobley met the requirements for Stand Your 
Ground immunity from prosecution. Id. 
 107. Tover v. State, 106 So. 3d 958, 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
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defense at trial.”108 Likewise, the court in Mederos v. State noted the difference 
between a claim of immunity from prosecution and a self-defense claim at trial, 
and held that the denial of the pretrial motion did not preclude the defendant from 
submitting the matter to the jury as an affirmative defense.109 
There are several lessons to be learned from these cases. It is prudent for a 
defendant to file a motion to dismiss the criminal information based on self-defense 
immunity at the earliest opportunity and request that the court set it for an 
evidentiary hearing.110 The court should set aside ample time to conduct a full 
evidentiary hearing, and then make appropriate findings to support its ruling. The 
defendant should be prepared to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
immunity attaches.111 Until resolved by the Supreme Court of Florida, the State’s 
burden of proof is unclear, and the State should be prepared to put on sufficient 
evidence to overcome the defendant’s burden of proof. 112 Finally, should the 
defendant fail to prove entitlement to immunity at a pretrial hearing, he or she 
should prepare to assert and prove self-defense at trial.113 
II.  IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL ACTION 
Although Stand Your Ground issues are more often encountered in the criminal 
law arena, section 776.032 also grants self-defense immunity in civil actions.114 As 
might be expected, there are few reported civil cases since the Law’s enactment.115 
In Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, an altercation ensued after an argument over the 
parking of a vehicle in a lot.116 The plaintiffs filed a civil suit against the defendant 
for assault and battery. The defendant sought self-defense immunity from the 
action.117 The trial court conducted a pretrial evidentiary hearing, and after 
considering the testimony of several witnesses, found that the defendant was 
entitled to immunity from the suit.118 The court thereupon dismissed the action with 
prejudice.119 
In another civil case, Professional Roofing and Sales, Inc. v. Flemmings, the 
plaintiff sued the defendant for assault and battery, alleging that the defendant had 
attacked him with a baseball bat at his place of employment.120 The plaintiff also 
sued the alleged assailant’s employer on theories of vicarious liability for 
negligence and negligent retention of a dangerous employee.121 The defendant filed 
 ________________________  
 108. Id. 
 109. Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 110. See Martinez v. State, 44 So. 3d 1219, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 111. See Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 112. See Mederos, 102 So. 3d at 11. 
 113. See Tover, 106 So. 3d at 959. 
 114. FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 115. See Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So. 3d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Prof’l Roofing & Sales, Inc. v. 
Flemmings, 138 So. 3d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 116. Pages, 134 So. 3d at 537–38. 
 117. Id. at 538. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Prof’l Roofing & Sales, 138 So. 3d at 526. 
 121. Id. 
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a motion to dismiss the suit based on self-defense immunity, and the trial court 
summarily denied the motion.122 The court also denied a subsequent similar motion 
on the same grounds as successive, and suggested that it might be dealt with on a 
summary judgment motion.123 Determining that a pretrial hearing was required, the 
appellate court remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing on the motion to 
dismiss.124 
In each of the foregoing cases, the defendant also faced criminal charges for 
the same episode.125 In Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, the plaintiffs were husband and 
wife.126 The defendant had been charged with felony battery for pushing the 
husband to the ground, and misdemeanor battery for bumping into the wife.127 
Pursuant to a negotiated plea, the defendant was adjudicated guilty of the 
misdemeanor, and the State entered a nolle prosequi of the felony charge.128 The 
defendant never sought immunity from prosecution based on the Stand Your 
Ground Law in the criminal case.129 
However, the defendant did so in Professional Roofing and Sales.130 In that 
case, the State had charged the defendant with aggravated battery with a deadly 
weapon because he struck the victim with a baseball bat.131 The defendant moved 
to dismiss the criminal action asserting that he was immune from prosecution 
because he used justifiable force to defend himself against the victim’s imminent 
use of unlawful force.132 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the criminal 
court agreed and dismissed the charges.133 
In his motion to dismiss the civil suit, which was based on the same underlying 
facts as the criminal action, the defendant argued that he was immune from the 
civil action under the Stand Your Ground Law because, on the same facts, the 
criminal court dismissed that action.134 This motion was summarily denied by the 
civil court.135 
The defendant made a compelling argument: the legal determination of 
immunity under the Stand Your Ground Law should only have to be made once, 
and under common law principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, immunity 
should automatically apply in the subsequent civil case.136 After analyzing the 
applicable law, the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida disagreed.137 
 ________________________  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 527. 
 125. See Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So. 3d 536, 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Prof’l Roofing & Sales, 
138 So. 3d at 526. 
 126. Pages, 134 So. 3d at 538. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Prof’l Roofing & Sales, 138 So. 3d at 526. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Prof’l Roofing & Sales, 138 So. 3d at 526. 
 137. Id. at 527. 
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Four elements are required for res judicata, or claim preclusion, to apply: (1) 
identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of 
persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the persons for or 
against whom the claim is made.138 Collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, 
requires five elements: (1) the identical issues were presented in a prior proceeding; 
(2) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior 
proceeding; (3) the issues in the prior litigation were a critical and necessary part of 
the prior determination; (4) the parties in the two proceeding were identical; and 
(5) the issues were actually litigated in the prior proceeding.139 
The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida found that the critical element 
missing as to both of these doctrines is mutuality of the parties.140 Since the State of 
Florida is a party in the criminal case and not in the civil case, each case involved 
different parties.141 “We also do not find that the Florida legislature modified or 
abrogated application of these common law doctrines when it conferred immunity 
from both civil and criminal actions under the Stand Your Ground Law.”142 Thus, a 
party seeking self-defense immunity in both a criminal and a civil case will likely 
have to litigate the issue twice.143 
The courts have treated claims of immunity from civil action similarly to those 
seeking immunity from criminal prosecution.144 The defendant should promptly file 
a motion to dismiss the action, and the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
If there was a preceding criminal action, a ruling on a motion to dismiss the 
prosecution will be of no consequence in the civil action. 
III.  UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY AND SELF-DEFENSE IMMUNITY 
A significant issue addressed by the courts is whether someone involved in an 
unlawful activity can obtain immunity under the Stand Your Ground Law.145 Since 
the enactment of the Stand Your Ground Law in 2005, this has been a debated 
topic in the appellate courts.146 Further complicating the issue, the Florida 
Legislature recently amended the Stand Your Ground Law concerning the unlawful 
activity issue.147 
Section 776.032 provides immunity from prosecution or civil action for “[a] 
person who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or 
s. 776.031 . . . .”148 In Brown v. State, the court explained: 
 ________________________  
 138. Id. (citing Topps v. State, 855 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004)). 
 139. Id. (citing Porter v. Saddlebrook Resorts, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1212, 1214-15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Prof’l Roofing and Sales, 138 So. 3d at 528. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So. 3d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Prof’l Roofing & Sales, 138 So. 
3d at 524. 
 145. See Brown v. State, 135 So. 3d 1160, 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 
216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Hill, 95 So. 3d 434, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 146. See Brown, 135 So. 3d at 1161; Little, 111 So. 3d at 216; Hill, 95 So. 3d at 434. 
 147. FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 148. FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) (amended 2014). 
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As the first line in the statute clearly sets out, there are three 
avenues by which a defendant’s use of force may qualify for the 
statutory immunity from prosecution: that his or her use of force 
was permitted by section 776.012; by section 776.013; or by 
section 776.031. For all three avenues, the 2005 
amendments/enactments abolished the duty to retreat if the other 
statutory justifications for use of force, including deadly force, 
were met. Of the three avenues for immunity, the use of force as 
permitted in section 776.013 is the only avenue limited to persons 
“not engaged in an unlawful activity.”149 
In State v. Hill, the defendant was charged with aggravated battery with a 
firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, together with other 
charges.150 He filed a motion to dismiss the aggravated battery count asserting that 
he was immune from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground Law.151 After 
conducting an evidentiary hearing and finding that he qualified, the trial court 
dismissed that charge.152 
The appellate court, however, disagreed.153 Determining that it was previously 
held that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is an “unlawful activity” 
under the Stand Your Ground Law,154 the court decided that the defendant could 
not obtain immunity by injuring his assailant with a firearm that he was not 
lawfully allowed to possess.155 The opinion went on to note that it did not comment 
on the defendant’s right to assert a justification defense.156 At least one other court 
has held that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is an unlawful activity 
under the Stand Your Ground Law.157 
After the case was remanded to the trial court, Mr. Hill sought dismissal of the 
charges because of his immunity under section 713.012 rather than section 
713.013, as he had claimed before.158 The trial court, relying on the broad language 
of the appellate court’s opinion, again denied the motion to dismiss, since Mr. Hill 
was engaged in an unlawful activity.159 The appellate court found that Mr. Hill is 
not precluded from claiming the justifiable use of force under section 776.012(1), 
or from seeking immunity under section 776.032.160 
 ________________________  
 149. Brown, 135 So. 3d at 1161. 
 150. Hill, 95 So. 3d at 434. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 435. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (citing Dorsey v. State, 74 So. 3d 521, 527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Although mentioned in the 
context of immunity in Dorsey, the unlawful activity issue in that case actually dealt with the appropriate self-
defense jury instructions.)). 
 155. Hill, 95 So. 3d at 435. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Darling v. State, 81 So. 3d 574, 578–79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 158. Hill v. State, 143 So. 3d 981, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 983–87. 
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The Second District Court of Appeal of Florida provided an in-depth analysis 
of the issue in Little v. State, but reached a different result.161 Aaron Little and his 
friend were walking toward Little’s girlfriend’s home when they encountered a 
parked vehicle.162 Demond Brooks jumped from the back seat of the car.163 Little 
knew Brooks, but they were not friends.164 Brooks suddenly pulled two handguns 
from his waistband, pointed them at Little, and said he was “going to make it 
rain.”165 Little ran behind his friend, and asked him to make Brooks stop.166 Little 
then ran into the house.167 Brooks followed Little but stopped on the front steps.168 
Brooks held the guns at his side and yelled for Little to come back out.169 Little, 
who was frightened, pulled a handgun from his pocket and asked the homeowner to 
“get” Brooks.170 She told Little to go outside because she did not want a gun in her 
house.171 Her son, who was outside laughing with Brooks, came in and ordered 
Little to leave.172 
Seeing no back door, Little eased his way out the front door holding his gun 
behind his back.173 He passed Brooks on the steps.174 Brooks made some 
comments, and Little urged him to calm down.175 When Little was in the driveway, 
Brooks pointed his guns at Little.176 Little raised his gun, closed his eyes, and fired 
several shots.177 Brooks was hit and died.178 At the time of the incident, Little was a 
convicted felon.179 
In the criminal proceedings, Little filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that he 
was immune from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground Law.180 In response, 
the State asserted two arguments: “(1) Little was not acting in self-defense because 
he reengaged Brooks after removing himself from the initial threat, and (2) Little 
was not entitled to immunity . . . because he was engaged in an unlawful activity as 
a felon in possession of a firearm.”181 After a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied 
the motion on the first ground.182 The appellate court decided that the trial court 
had erred in reaching that conclusion because Little’s use of deadly force was 
 ________________________  
 161. Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Little, 111 So. 3d at 216. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 217. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Little, 111 So. 3d at 217. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Little, 111 So. 3d at 219. 
 180. Id. at 217. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
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justified under the circumstances.183 In the appeal, the State argued that the ruling 
of the trial court should be upheld under the “tipsy coachman” theory;184 since 
Little was engaged in an unlawful activity, he was not entitled to immunity in any 
event.185 
Construing section 776.032 to give effect to legislative intent, the court 
concluded that the plain meaning of the statute is for it to provide immunity to a 
person who qualifies under either section 776.012(1) or section 776.013(3); in 
other words, each section was intended to provide a separate basis for immunity 
under section 776.032(1).186 
Thus, the court concluded that section 776.032(1) “provides for immunity from 
criminal prosecution for persons using force as permitted in section 776.012, 
section 776.013, or section 776.031.”187 Since Little was a felon in possession of a 
firearm, he did not qualify for immunity under section 776.013.188 He did, 
however, seek immunity for his use of force under section 776.012(1), and his 
status as a felon in illegal possession of a handgun did not prohibit immunity under 
that section.189 
The Little court noted that it could not find any prior cases addressing this 
issue, but it did consider State v. Hill, discussed above.190 In Hill, the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal decided that the defendant’s use of force did not qualify 
for immunity under section 776.013(3) because he was engaged in an unlawful 
activity—possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.191 In Little, the Second 
District Court of Appeal noted that the Fourth District did not address whether the 
use of force by a person engaged in an illegal activity would qualify for immunity 
from prosecution under section 776.012(1).192 The Second District certified a 
conflict with the Fourth District as to this issue and went on to certify the following 
 ________________________  
 183. Id. at 218. 
 184. Id. (citing Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 961 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). The “tipsy 
coachman” rule, which says that even if a trial court’s ruling is based on erroneous reasoning, the decision will be 
upheld if there is any basis in the record which would support the judgment, comes to Florida from Georgia 
through the  
Supreme Court of Florida in Carraway v. Amour & Co. 156 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. 1963). “We are reminded of 
Goldsmith’s [poem] RETALIATION:  
‘The pupil of impulse, it forc’d him along, 
His conduct still right, with his argument wrong; 
Still aiming at honour, yet fearing to roam, 
The coachman was tipsy, the chariot drove home.’” 
Id. (citing Lee v. Porter, 63 Ga. 345, 346 (1879)).  
 185. Little, 111 So. 3d at 218–19. 
 186. Id. at 219 (emphasis added). 
 187. Id. at 221–22.  
 188. Id. at 222. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Little, 111 So. 3d at 222 (citing State v. Hill, 95 So. 3d 434, 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)). However, 
as previously mentioned, the Fourth District is now in line with the Second District after the issue was again 
considered in Hill v. State, 143 So. 3d 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 192. Id. 
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question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance: “IS A 
DEFENDANT WHO ESTABLISHES BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE THAT HIS USE OF DEADLY FORCE IS PERMITTED IN 
SECTION 776.012(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2009), ENTITLED TO 
IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 776.032(1) EVEN THOUGH HE IS ENGAGED 
IN AN UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY AT THE TIME THAT HE USES THE 
DEADLY FORCE?”193  
As of the writing of this article, the Supreme Court of Florida has not taken 
jurisdiction.  
The Fourth District Court of Appeal again addressed this issue in State v. 
Wonder.194 There, the defendant was charged with manslaughter for shooting an 
individual at a post office.195 He moved to dismiss the information based on 
immunity from prosecution under sections 776.032 and 776.012.196 After hearing 
the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.197 The State requested the 
trial judge to determine that the defendant was engaged in an illegal activity—
possession of a firearm on post office property.198 The trial court decided that it 
was not an unlawful activity.199 When the defendant appealed the denial of his 
motion, the State again raised the issue.200 The appellate court agreed with the 
defendant that a determination of that issue was unnecessary because his motion 
was filed under section 776.012, not section 776.013.201 The court in Wonder noted 
that it had recently certified conflict with Little v. State202 on this issue and in dicta, 
went on to say that it agreed with the analysis in Little.203 
The issue of whether a person engaged in an unlawful activity can seek 
immunity was also addressed in Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, the civil action discussed 
above.204 The court found that even if the defendant’s guilty plea of misdemeanor 
battery established as a matter of law that he was engaged in a criminal activity at 
the time he used force, he sought immunity under both section 776.012 and section 
776.013.205 The court recognized that a person must establish that he is not engaged 
in an unlawful activity as a prerequisite to relief under section 776.013, but is not 
required to do so when seeking immunity under section 776.012.206 Since the 
defendant sought immunity under both sections, he was only prohibited from 
 ________________________  
 193. Id. at 222–23.  
 194. State v. Wonder, 128 So. 3d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), overruled by State v. Wonder, Nos. 4D12–
4510, 4D12–4559, 2014 WL 3928449, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2014).  
 195. Id. at 868. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Wonder, 128 So. 3d at 869. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 869 n.2. 
 203. See id. at 870. 
 204. See Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So. 3d 536, 539–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 205. Id. at 539. 
 206. Id. 
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obtaining immunity under section 776.013 and could seek immunity under section 
776.012.207 
As mentioned supra, the Florida legislature made significant changes to the 
Stand Your Ground Law as it pertains to immunity for those involved in unlawful 
activities.208 Section 776.012 was amended by the inclusion of the following: 
A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance 
with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the 
right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to 
use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a 
place where he or she has a right to be.209 
Thus, as discussed in the foregoing cases, where there was no exclusion from 
immunity for a person engaged in an unlawful activity under section 712.012, there 
is now.210 
Interestingly, section 776.013 was also amended.211 While section 776.013(3) 
previously limited the use of force to those “not engaged in an unlawful activity,” 
that language was deleted from the statute.212 As discusses in the cases above, that 
was considered to be the only avenue available for immunity for one who was 
engaged in an unlawful activity. 
These amendments are discussed in both State v. Wonder213 and Hill v. State.214  
The court in Hill notes that the legislature’s inclusion of that language supports its 
conclusion that the statute did not intend to prohibit one engaged in an unlawful 
activity from seeking immunity from prosecution under section 776.032 when 
using justifiable force under section 776.012(1).215 
These amendments to the Stand Your Ground Law are not likely to be applied 
retroactively. The legislature did not make any clear statement as to the retroactive 
or prospective application of the amendments.216 Thus, those who were engaged in 
unlawful activities and seek immunity for incidents occurring prior to June 20, 
2014 may receive different treatment from those whose incidents occurred 
thereafter.   
 ________________________  
 207. See id. at 539–40.  
 208. FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 209. FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 210. Id. The same change was made to FLA. STAT. § 776.031, with the same result. 
 211. FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2013) (amended 2014). 
 212. Id.  
 213. State v. Wonder, Nos. 4D12–4510, 4D12–4559, 2014 WL 3928449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 
2014).. 
 214. 143 So. 3d 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 215. Id. at 986. 
 216. “A general rule of statutory construction is that, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the 
contrary, a law is presumed to act prospectively.”  State v. Kelly, 588 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).  
Two general exceptions apply: First, procedural statutes may be applied retroactively.  Second, remedial statutes 
may receive retroactive application.  Id. Perhaps an argument may be made that the recent statutory changes are 
remedial.  Remedial statutes relate to remedies or modes of procedure, and do not create new or take away vested 
rights.  City of Lakeland v. Cantinella, 129 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1961).  Given the treatment of these immunity issues 
by the Florida courts of appeal, that argument seems unlikely to prevail. 
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It will be interesting to see how the Supreme Court of Florida will address this 
issue, if indeed it does so. Certainly, the approach taken by the Second District 
Court of Appeal in Little v. State217 seems well-reasoned. It is based on sound 
principles of statutory construction. The Third District, without mentioning Little, 
used the same analysis and reached the same result.218 The Fourth District has also 
acknowledged the soundness of that reasoning.219 Thus, it is likely that a person 
engaged in an unlawful activity at the time of the use of force for an incident 
occurring before the statutory amendments will be able to seek immunity from 
criminal prosecution or civil action if that immunity is sought under section 
776.012, but not under section 776.013.220 For an incident occurring after the 
effective date of the amendments, the opposite result is likely. In either instance, 
however, in filing a motion to dismiss, it is vital for a defendant to designate the 
particular statute he or she is using as a basis for immunity.221 
Although the issue has not yet been clarified by the Supreme Court of Florida, 
the more persuasive authority demonstrates that a defendant who was involved in 
an unlawful activity at the time of the use of force in self-defense may still seek 
immunity from criminal prosecution or civil action, but only if he or she is not 
disqualified by the statute under which the immunity is sought. In filing a motion 
to dismiss, the defendant should clearly detail the particular statute that provides 
the basis for the immunity. Finally, even if the defendant is precluded from 
obtaining immunity because of an unlawful activity, the defendant may still assert 
a justification defense at trial. 
VI.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Another difficult issue confronting the courts since the enactment of the Stand 
Your Ground Law concerns jury instructions. Prior self-defense jury instructions 
include language concerning the duty to retreat.222 Since the duty to retreat was 
virtually eliminated,223 the use of the outdated jury instructions is problematic.224 
Instructing the jury on the duty to retreat for offenses that occur after the 
effective date of the Stand Your Ground Law can be fundamental error, requiring 
 ________________________  
 217. See Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 218–22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 218. See Pages, 134 So. 3d at 539–40. 
 219. See State v. Wonder, 128 So. 3d 867, 869–70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 220. See, e.g., Pages, 134 So. 3d at 539. 
 221. See Brown v. State, 135 So. 3d 1160, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014), 
In order to sufficiently raise a claim for immunity under section 776.032(1), the defendant 
must identify the particular statutory basis or avenue (section 776.012; 776.013; 776.031; or 
any combination thereof) upon which he or she relies to justify the force used. The potential 
for confusion in the absence of such specification is illustrated by the certified conflict and 
question of great public importance in the Second District’s Little decision and the conflict 
with the Fourth District’s Hill decision certified in Bragdon v. State.   
Id. (citation omitted). See generally Bragdon v. State, 123 So. 3d 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 222. See, e.g., Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2000). 
 223. See discussion, supra part I of this paper. 
 224. See, e.g., Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2000). 
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reversal.225 Even where defense counsel failed to object to the outdated duty to 
retreat instruction, courts have found that the given instruction is an incorrect 
statement of the law that negates the argument of self-defense, and is a 
fundamental error requiring a reversal of the conviction.226 
The standard jury instruction concerning the justifiable use of deadly force 
applicable to criminal offenses occurring prior to October 1, 2005, the effective 
date of the new Stand Your Ground Law,227 provided that  
[t]he defendant cannot justify the use of force likely to cause 
death or great bodily harm unless [he][she] used every reasonable 
means within [his] [her] power and consistent with [his][her] own 
safety to avoid the danger before resorting to that force. 
The fact that the defendant was wrongfully attacked cannot 
justify [his][her] use of force likely to cause death or great bodily 
harm if by retreating [he][she] could have avoided the need to use 
that force. However, if the defendant was placed in a position of 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and it would have 
increased [his] [her] own danger to retreat, then [his][her] use of 
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm was justifiable.228 
After the enactment of the Stand Your Ground Law, the standard jury 
instruction was modified, and in pertinent part now reads: 
If the defendant was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was 
attacked in any place where [he][she] had a right to be, [he][she] 
had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand [his][her] ground 
and meet force with force, including deadly force, if [he][she] 
reasonably believed that it was necessary to do so to prevent death 
or great bodily harm to [himself][herself] or to prevent the 
commission of a forcible felony.229 
In Floyd v. State, a fight broke out during a party at the defendant’s 
residence.230 He armed himself with a rifle.231 A gunfight ensued, and the defendant 
 ________________________  
 225. See Williams v. State, 982 So. 2d 1190, 1193–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Despite the defense 
attorney’s failure to object at trial, the court determined that the given instruction was an incorrect statement of the 
law which negated the defendant’s only defense, and was thus a fundamental error requiring reversal of his 
conviction. Id. 
 226. See id.; see also Richards v. State, 39 So. 3d 431, 433–34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). In determining 
whether jury instructions constitute fundamental error, a court must consider “the effect of the erroneous 
instruction in the context of the other instructions given, the evidence adduced in the case, and the arguments and 
trial strategies of counsel.” Smith v. State, 76 So. 3d 379, 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  
 227. 2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 436 (West).  
 228. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2000).  
 229. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2006). 
 230. Floyd v. State, No. 1D11–4465, 2014 WL 4197377, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2014). 
 231. Id. 
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shot someone in the back, killing him.232 The defendant asserted self-defense at 
trial, but was convicted of second degree murder.233 He appealed.234 The appellate 
court found that a conflicting jury instruction amounted to a fundamental error 
requiring reversal of his conviction.235 
Prior to deliberations, the trial court gave the jury the following instruction: 
If the defendant was not engaged in any unlawful activity and 
was attacked in any place where he had a right to be, he had no 
duty to retreat and had the right to stand his ground and meet 
force with force, including deadly force, if he reasonably 
believed that it was necessary to do so to prevent death or great 
bodily harm to himself or another, or to prevent the commission of 
a forceable [sic] felony.236 
However, the use of deadly force is not justifiable if you find: 
1. Robert Franklin Floyd initially provoked the use of force 
against himself, unless [:] 
A. The force asserted toward the Defendant was so great that he 
reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or 
great bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to 
escape the danger other than using deadly force.237 
The defendant prevailed on his argument that one section of the jury 
instruction negated the other.238 That constituted fundamental error, the court 
concluded, and his conviction was reversed.239 
An issue with the jury instructions arose in Dorsey v. State.240 There, a dispute 
at a high school keg party escalated into a fight, resulting in the deaths of two 
young men after being shot by the defendant.241 He was charged with two counts of 
second degree murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and carrying a 
concealed weapon.242 The defendant was tried and convicted of those charges.243 
Although the defendant argued that the shooting was in self-defense, his 
counsel requested that the court not give the Stand Your Ground instruction based 
on section 776.013(3) because the defendant, a convicted felon, was engaged in an 
 ________________________  
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Floyd, 2014 WL 419377 at *2 (alterations in original).  
 237. Id. at *1 (alternations in original).   
 238. Id. at *2.  
 239. Id. at *2–3. 
 240. Dorsey v. State, 74 So. 3d 521, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  
 241. Id. at 522–23.  
 242. Id. at 522.  
 243. Id. at 522–23. 
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unlawful activity—possession of a concealed firearm—at the time of the 
incident.244 The trial court declined and stated its intent to include the standard 
Stand Your Ground instruction.245 The defendant’s counsel then proposed that the 
court give the following special instruction: 
If you find that the defendant was engaging in an unlawful 
activity or was attacked in a place where he did not have the right 
to be then you must consider if the defendant had a duty to retreat. 
If the defendant was placed in a position of imminent danger or 
death or great bodily harm and it would have increased his own 
danger to retreat then his use of force likely to cause death or 
great bodily harm was justifiable.246 
The emphasized portion of the requested instruction was taken from the pre-
2005 standard jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force. 247 The court 
also declined to give that instruction.248 The defendant was subsequently found 
guilty and convicted as charged.249 
Noting that the courts in Williams v. State250 and Richards v. State251 found 
fundamental error when the jury was charged with the pre-2005 instruction on the 
justifiable use of deadly force after the enactment of section 776.013, the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal distinguished those cases.252 Unlike those cases, there was 
an issue in this case as to whether the defendant was involved in an unlawful 
activity at the time of the incident.253 The court found that the current standard jury 
instruction254 does not inform the jury of the scope of the duty to retreat in 
circumstances where the person is engaged in an unlawful activity or is in a place 
where he or she had no right to be at the time of the attack.255 The court went on to 
say that since the plain language of section 776.013(3) provides that the “no duty to 
retreat” rule applies only when one “is not engaged in an unlawful activity,” the 
common law duty to retreat must still apply.256 Suggesting that the trial court could 
have either not given the standard Stand Your Ground instruction, or given both 
that instruction and the special instruction requested by the defendant, the court 
reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.257 
 ________________________  
 244. Id. at 525–26 (citing FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended 2014)).  
 245. Id. at 526.  
 246. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 526. 
 247. Id. (citing Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2004)).  
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 523.  
 250. Williams v. State, 982 So.2d 1190, 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 251. Richards v. State, 39 So. 3d 431, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.  2010).  
 252. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 526–27.  
 253. Id. 
 254. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (2011). 
 255. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 527. 
 256. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT.  § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014)).  
 257. Id. at 527–28.  
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The most recent case to consider this issue is Hardison v. State.258 There, the 
defendant was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and asserted at trial that 
he used deadly force in self-defense.259 He was convicted of second-degree murder 
and challenged his conviction, asserting on appeal that the trial court committed 
fundamental error by using an improper jury instruction.260 The trial court gave not 
only the current standard jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force, but 
added a special instruction requested by defense counsel which informed the jury 
that a convicted felon may lawfully possess a firearm in certain instances.261 
The First District Court of Appeal provided a thoughtful analysis of the issue. 
It considered two cases that dealt with immunity from prosecution—Little v. 
State262 and State v. Wonder.263 Following the reasoning of those cases, the court 
noted that there is a difference between the language of section 776.012(1) and 
section 776.013(3): 
Section 776.013(3) applies when a person is (1) not engaged in an 
unlawful activity and (2) attacked outside the “castle” as long as 
(3) he or she has a right to be there. A person who does not meet 
these three requirements would look to section 776.012(1) to 
determine whether the use of deadly force was justified. . . . 
The requirements under sections 776.012(1) and 776.013(3) are 
not identical. A person proceeding under section 776.013(3) would 
have to prove that he or she reasonably believed the use of deadly 
force was “necessary…to prevent death or great bodily harm…or 
to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” Under section 
776.012(1), a person would have to prove that he or she reasonably 
believed the use of deadly force was “necessary to prevent 
 ________________________  
 258. Hardison v. State, 138 So. 3d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 259. Id. at 1134.  
 260. Id. at 1130.  
 261. Id. at 1134 (citing Marrero v. State, 516 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)). The instruction 
given at the defense’s request stated:  
However, in certain circumstances, a convicted felon may lawfully possess a firearm.  Those 
circumstances are, one, the felon must be in present, imminent and impending peril of death 
or serious bodily injury, or reasonably believed himself or others to be in such danger; two, 
the felon must not have intentionally or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it 
was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct.  Three, the felon must 
not have any reasonable, legal alternative to possession [of] the firearm.  Four, the firearm 
must be made available to the felon without preconceived design.  And, five, the felon must 
give up possession of the firearm as soon as necessity or apparent necessity ends.  
Id. This instruction is based on Marrero v. State, which sets forth the elements of the “necessity” or “justification 
defense” against a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Marrero, 516 So. 2d at 1055.  
 262. See Hardison, 138 So. 3d at 1133 (citing Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)). 
 263. Id. at 1134 (citing State v. Wonder, 128 So. 3d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), overruled by State v. 
Wonder, Nos. 4D12–4510, 4D12–4559, 2014 WL 3928449, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2014). 
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imminent death or great bodily harm…or to prevent the imminent 
commission of a forcible felony.”264 
If the challenged instruction had not contained the portion requested by defense 
counsel, the appellate court indicated that it would tend to agree with the defendant 
and find fundamental error; however, when considered as a whole, the court found 
that the jury was properly instructed on the justifiable use of deadly force.265 The 
court did say that “[t]hese decisions suggest that Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f) 
could stand revision to clarify the circumstances under which the use of deadly 
force is justified. However, we make no such assertion today, and we decidedly do 
not hold that standard instruction is fundamentally flawed.”266 
Given the state of confusion involving proper jury instructions, particularly 
when the defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity at the time, criminal courts 
and counsel should exercise due care in charging the jury properly when Stand 
Your Ground self-defense is asserted. The jury should not be instructed on a duty 
to retreat if not required by the circumstances of the case. Trial courts should be 
cautious in using pre-2005 standard jury instructions when the use of deadly force 
in self-defense is an issue. Further, the current instructions should be modified.267 
The courts should also exercise caution in the use of proper jury instructions when 
a defendant is engaged in an unlawful activity at the time force was used in self-
defense. 
V.  APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Another significant issue the courts have had to consider since the enactment 
of the Stand Your Ground Law concerns the proper procedure for perfecting an 
appeal.268 Clearly, and as discussed above, a defendant may challenge an order 
denying a motion to dismiss based on immunity from criminal prosecution in a 
direct appeal upon a conviction.269 However, challenges to these orders have also 
been made by other methods.270 
In Little v. State, the defendant sought review of an order denying his motion to 
dismiss charges based on immunity by filing a petition for writ of certiorari.271 The 
court treated the petition as a petition for writ of prohibition.272 The court 
 ________________________  
 264. Id. at 1133 (citing Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)) (alterations in 
original). 
 265. Id. at 1134–35. 
 266. Id.  
 267. The self-defense instructions 3.6(f) and (g) are currently under review by the Committee on Standard 
Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. 
 268. Little, 111 So. 3d at 216 n.1 (citing Montanez v. State, 24 So. 3d 799, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)).  
 269. See, e.g., Montanez, 24 So. 3d at 801.  
 270. See, e.g., Little, 111 So. 3d at 216 n.1.  
 271. Id. at 216–17. A writ of certiorari under common law is a device by which an upper court can direct a 
lower tribunal to send up the record of a pending case so that it may review it for regularity, and it is an 
extraordinary remedy. Broward Cnty. v. G.B.V. Intern., Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 842 (Fla. 2001).  
 272. Little, 111 So. 3d at 216. A writ of prohibition is used to prevent a court from continuing to exercise 
jurisdiction it does not have, or to prevent a court from assuming jurisdiction over a case in which it legally 
cannot. A.D.W. v. State, 777 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
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acknowledged that it had previously entertained these challenges by way of 
petitions for certiorari, but it expressed concerns as to whether certiorari is the 
proper method for review of these orders given the available remedy of review on 
direct appeal of a subsequent conviction.273 Recognizing that the Supreme Court of 
Florida has held that the appropriate method to review orders denying motions to 
dismiss criminal prosecutions based on immunity claims is by prohibition, the 
court concluded that “the better avenue for review is a petition for writ of 
prohibition. . . .”274 
Most of the Florida district courts now agree that a petition for writ of 
prohibition is an appropriate method for obtaining review of a trial court’s denial of 
a claim of immunity from prosecution.275 Further, if the appellate court has 
reviewed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss by writ of prohibition, it is 
precluded by res judicata from again reviewing the same issue on direct appeal 
following a subsequent conviction.276 
Although a defendant must appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss by a 
petition for writ of prohibition, it appears that if the State wishes to challenge an 
order on a motion to dismiss, it must do so by petition for writ of certiorari.277 In 
Wonder v. State, the State petitioned for a writ of certiorari challenging the part of 
a trial court order determining that the defendant was not involved in a unlawful 
activity at the time of the shooting.278 The appellate court denied the petition, but 
there was no indication in the opinion that the state had sought review by an 
improper method.279 
In Martinez v. State, the trial court refused to hold a pretrial hearing on the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss asserting immunity from prosecution because there 
was insufficient time prior to trial, and instead heard the motion during the trial.280 
The defendant filed a petition for writ of mandamus,281 seeking to compel the trial 
court to conduct a pretrial hearing.282 The appellate court agreed that the motion 
must be heard prior to trial and granted the petition for writ of mandamus.283 
In summary, if a trial court refuses to hear a motion to dismiss based on 
immunity from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground Law, a petition for writ 
 ________________________  
 273. Little, 111 So. 3d at 216, n.1 (citing Montanez, 24 So. 3d at 801).  
 274. Id. (citing Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1977)).   
 275. See, e.g., Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Little, 111 So. 3d at 216 n.1; 
Joseph v. State, 103 So. 3d 227, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Bretherick v. State, 135 So. 3d 337, 339–40 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013). Further, the standard of review by the appellate court is mixed: the trial court’s findings are 
presumed correct and may only be reversed when not supported by competent substantial evidence, while the trial 
court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Mobley v. State, 132 So. 3d 1160, 1161–62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2014). 
 276. Rice v. State, 90 So. 3d 929, 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 277. State v. Caamano, 105 So. 3d 18, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).  
 278. State v. Wonder, Nos. 4D12–4510, 4D12–4559, 2014 WL 3928449, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 
2014).  
 279. Id.  
 280. Martinez v. State, 44 So. 3d 1219, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 281. Id. A writ of mandamus is a common law writ used to compel the performance of an official duty 
where an official has failed to undertake the duty. State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 150 So. 508, 511 
(Fla. 1933).   
 282. Martinez, 44 So. 3d at 1220.  
 283. Id. at 1221. 
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of mandamus is the appropriate method of review in the appellate court.284 If the 
trial court hears and denies the motion, the proper remedy for the defendant is to 
seek appellate review by a petition for writ of prohibition.285 If the State desires to 
challenge such an order, it should do so by petition for writ of certiorari.286 Finally, 
if a motion is denied and the defendant is convicted of the criminal charges, a 
defendant may challenge the denial of the motion together with the conviction by 
direct appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Gabriel Mobley, introduced at the beginning of this article, traveled a different 
course through the legal system than those arrested prior to the enactment of the 
Stand Your Ground Law. As the case law demonstrates, the Stand Your Ground 
cases are usually factually convoluted and often difficult to unravel.287 Law 
enforcement officers and prosecutors are required to analyze the facts and make 
arrests and charging decisions, while defense lawyers must review the facts and 
make strategy decisions. Judges are required to consider the facts and make 
significant decisions, while jurors must consider the facts to make ultimate 
decisions. Overlying all of this is the law itself, and knowledge of the procedural 
and substantive aspects of the Stand Your Ground Law is imperative for those 
involved in making these decisions. 
Since the enactment of the Stand Your Ground Law, the courts have addressed 
areas of concern including the proper procedures for processing immunity claims 
in both criminal and civil actions,288 the ability of one engaged in an unlawful 
activity to seek immunity,289 appropriate self-defense jury instructions,290 and the 
proper method to appeal immunity orders.291 This is a work in progress, and the 
courts will continue to interpret the Stand Your Ground Law to provide those 
decision makers with more certainty for the Law’s implementation and application.  
 
 ________________________  
 284. Id.  
 285. See Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 216 
n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Joseph v. State, 103 So. 3d 227, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Bretherick v. State, 
135 So. 3d 337, 339–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 286. State v. Caamano, 105 So. 3d 18, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 287. See, e.g., Horn v. State, 17 So. 3d 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), overruled by State v. Egido, 113 So. 
3d 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 288. See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010); Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008); Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 289. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 135 So. 3d 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Little, 111 So. 3d 214; State v. 
Wonder, 28 So. 3d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), abrogated by State v. Wonder, Nos. 4D12–4510, 4D12–4559, 
2014 WL 3928449, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2014).  
 290. See, e.g., Floyd v. State, No. 1D11–4465, 2014 WL 4197377, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2014); 
Dorsey v. State, 74 So. 3d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 291. See, e.g., Little, 111 So. 3d 214; Wonder, 28 So. 3d 867, abrogated by Wonder, 2014 WL 3928449, at 
*1; Martinez v. State, 44 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).  
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